South Africa’s constitutional commitment to a non-racial society is facing a growing test, according to analysts who warn that political mobilisation along racial, ethnic and tribal lines is reshaping the country’s fragmented political landscape and, with it, the accountability structures on which democratic governance depends.
The warning was voiced most prominently by retired judge Azhar Cachalia, head of the civic organisation Freedom Under Law, who told an audience at the University of Cape Town recently that an “ugly brand of ethno-nationalist politics” is challenging the country’s constitutional foundations. Cachalia, a senior figure in legal oversight circles, observed that some political movements are increasingly rallying support around ethnicity, race and cultural identity rather than around the shared constitutional values that underpin the post-apartheid settlement.
His intervention places the question squarely before the institutions charged with safeguarding that settlement: whether parties competing for office remain bound by the constitutional vision of non-racialism, or whether identity is displacing it as the organising principle of political competition.
Analysts Lesiba Teffo and Dirk Kotzé, while noting that the phenomenon manifests differently across parties, agree that identity politics is becoming a more visible feature of South African politics. Both stress that the trend is not unique to South Africa and is evident across much of the continent, where voters frequently identify with leaders who share their ethnic, linguistic or cultural backgrounds, and where appeals to ethnicity remain a common feature of election campaigns.
Kotzé argued that the electoral growth of the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) party owes less to conventional election dynamics than to the identity of its leader, Jacob Zuma, who is Zulu, and to a support base that is overwhelmingly Zulu. He recalled that the party emerged amid claims of Zulu humiliation following Zuma’s conviction for contempt of court and subsequent imprisonment. “Zulus believe they are a nation and the rest of us must respect them,” Kotzé said, adding that other parties also draw support through identity politics. “What it means is that identity politics is becoming a growing trend. The Patriotic Alliance is part of it, the Freedom Front Plus is part of it and, now, MK party is also part of it.” More recently, he noted, Fadiel Adams and his National Coloured Congress have also entered the space.
For governance observers, the significance lies in how these formations operate within, or in tension with, the constitutional framework. Kotzé dismissed suggestions that the parties concerned were pursuing secession, with the exception of some disaffected Capetonians and elements within the National Coloured Congress in the Western Cape. While he described the Patriotic Alliance as part of the identity politics trend because of its appeal to coloured voters, he said the party was not advocating secession. At present, the idea of Western Cape secession is far less prominent than in previous years. Rather than seeking independence, groups advocating regional interests appear more focused on securing greater political influence within the existing constitutional order.
Even so, the secession question has not disappeared entirely. Kotzé said independence for the Western Cape or KwaZulu-Natal is unlikely to gain traction, given opposition from major political parties and the African Union’s long-standing position against altering colonial-era borders, a stance rooted partly in concern that redrawing boundaries could trigger instability and conflict. That continental institutional posture remains a significant constraint on any subnational movement seeking to exit the constitutional framework.
Meanwhile, Teffo pointed to parallel dynamics elsewhere in the party system. The United Democratic Movement, led by General Bantu Holomisa, enjoys strong support among Xhosa-speaking communities, particularly in the Eastern Cape, because of Holomisa’s roots in what Teffo described as “Xhosa land”. Traditionally viewed as a “Transkei party”, the UDM has broadened its reach across the province as voters drift away from the ANC. The Economic Freedom Fighters, he said, attracted strong youth support because its leader, Julius Malema, was young, radical and spoke directly to the aspirations of young people, and the party has capitalised politically on unemployment and marginalised youth.
Even the governing party has not escaped the pattern. Although the ANC embraces non-racialism and opposes tribalism, some critics viewed it during the Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki administrations as dominated by Xhosa-speaking leaders, a phenomenon some commentators labelled “Xhosa nostra”. Under Zuma, the perception shifted towards Zulu nationalism, with many Inkatha Freedom Party supporters reportedly switching allegiance to the ANC in support of him. The Democratic Alliance, meanwhile, is often perceived as a white-led party focused on the interests of wealthy South Africans and big business.
Teffo concurred with Kotzé that the phenomenon extends across the continent. In many African countries, leaders are elected as much for who they are and the groups they represent as for their policies. Observers often note that in Zimbabwe, apart from allegations of electoral manipulation, Zanu-PF has maintained its dominance in part through support from the country’s Shona-speaking majority.
For those charged with upholding South Africa’s constitutional order, the analysts’ message is that identity-based mobilisation, while not new, now poses a more direct challenge to the founding vision of a non-racial society. Whether the institutions responsible for defending that vision can hold the line as competition hardens along identity lines is the question now before them.