When Vladimir Putin convenes his third Russia-Africa Summit at the end of October, the gathering will once again test a recurring question of accountability: whether pledges made at these high-profile diplomatic events are ever followed through, and who answers when they are not. Observers are turning to the record of the two previous summits for clues about how to weigh the deals expected to be signed in Moscow.
The ledger so far is thin. At the inaugural summit in Sochi in 2019, Russia committed to doubling trade with Africa within five years, from roughly $20 billion to $40 billion. Instead, trade contracted to $14 billion over that period. It has since recovered to about $27 billion, but the balance is heavily skewed: Moscow exports about seven times more than it imports from the continent, and Russia accounts for less than 1% of foreign direct investment in Africa.
Dr. Joseph Siegle, director of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, told ADF that the 43 African heads of state who attended the Sochi meeting initially greeted it with enthusiasm. “There was a sense that Russia may represent a new source of investment and trade that would open up more economic opportunities,” he said. That expectation gave way to a harder assessment. “There was a recognition that Russia didn’t really have a lot to offer economically to the continent,” Siegle said, adding that “by 2023 there was a lot more skepticism toward Moscow.”
By contrast, the 2023 summit in St. Petersburg, held a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, drew only 17 heads of state. It took place while Russia was attacking commercial vessels in the Black Sea and blockading shipments of grain and fertilizer to the continent. The meeting’s most publicized commitment, a Putin pledge to donate 25,000 to 50,000 tons of grain to six African countries, was met with scrutiny from analysts who noted that the donation to preferred recipients amounted to a small fraction of the hundreds of thousands of tons being held up by the blockade. “The donations were a drop in the bucket to the constrictions on grain, fertilizer, and fuel that have been caused,” Siegle said.
Those constrictions have persisted. As of 2026, attacks on commercial vessels continue. In July alone, Russia launched at least 23 strikes against the port infrastructure of Greater Odesa, where most of Ukraine’s wheat and agricultural products are stored and shipped. Goods bound for Africa and other markets remain stuck in storage facilities in Ukraine and Russia, and food and fertilizer prices remain elevated. Egypt, the top global buyer of wheat from the region, will receive about one-tenth of the amount it did last year, Reuters reported. “When Russia attacks vessels in Odesa Bay, it is not merely disrupting Ukraine’s exports. It is increasing the risk of a genuine global food crisis,” Illia Kabachynskyi wrote for United24 Media, noting that the global price effect falls hardest on countries that already spend a disproportionately large share of their budgets on food imports.
Meanwhile, the debt forgiveness announced at the 2023 summit has drawn similar scrutiny. The $23 billion in Soviet-era debt owed by African countries was, observers noted, so old that it was unserviceable by modern Russia. Siegle called the pledge “symbolic.” “Those debts were incurred so far back that they weren’t actually adding to the interest and debt burdens that African countries were paying and therefore did not change the economic picture that they are facing,” he said. “So, officially, it wipes the slate clean and allows relationships to move forward, but from a practical standpoint it didn’t mean that much.”
Security commitments have followed a comparable pattern. More than 40 African countries have reportedly signed military cooperation agreements with Russia, yet experts point out that formal military-to-military cooperation remains very small in scope. The primary instrument of engagement continues to be mercenaries, with the state-backed Africa Corps present in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali and elsewhere. Writing for Nigeria’s This Day news site, researcher Oumarou Sanou argued that the pitch to African nations is principally one of “regime protection,” aimed at the growing number of leaders who take power through coups or other non-democratic means. “Moscow’s pitch to Africa rests on a narrower premise than its rhetoric suggests, not development, not shared prosperity, but protection, delivered through private military contractors and now the state-run Africa Corps,” Sanou wrote. Billed as counterterror forces, the Africa Corps deployments have failed to halt the spread of terror in the Sahel and now mainly offer protection for autocratic leaders.
Analyst Mustapha Bature Sallama, writing for the Modern Ghana website, tallied the shortfalls: “Between the promise of a rotating host country which never materialized, unmet trade goals, and economic commitments that remain limited, several announcements made at previous summits are struggling to produce the results that were hoped for.” Statements at the 2023 summit had indicated that a future summit would be held on the African continent. Instead, the 2026 event is set for Moscow, forcing delegations to travel to an active war zone. Approximately 17 heads of state have confirmed attendance, with some delegations reportedly questioning why they are being asked to make the trip.
For Sallama, the venue itself underscores the imbalance at the heart of the relationship. “The fact that a third consecutive summit is being held in Russia illustrates the disconnect between the rhetoric of a ‘partnership of equals,’ and a relationship whose agenda, priorities and organization continue to be defined, largely, from Moscow,” he said.
Whether the Moscow gathering produces commitments that outlast the closing ceremony, or joins the Sochi trade target and the St. Petersburg grain pledge on the ledger of unmet promises, is the question delegations will carry into October.