Hung councils hold the purse strings in 72 municipalities

Hung councils hold the purse strings in 72 municipalities

Coalition bargaining now shapes budgets and service delivery across municipalities

Seventy-two of the 90 councils declared by the Independent Electoral Commission are hung, and that arithmetic now sits at the centre of South Africa’s local government finances. With no party holding an outright majority in those municipalities, the budgets, revenue collection and infrastructure spending that keep services running depend on coalition deals between parties with a thin record of governing together. Experts warn that if those deals are built on position-swapping rather than programmes, the cost will be measured in stalled services and weakened municipal balance sheets.

The clock is tight. Under the Municipal Structures Act, parties have 14 days from the declaration of results to establish the first council meeting, where votes for mayor and speaker take place. Jonathan Moakes, Director at SABI Strategy Group, gave that figure in an interview with 702’s Clement Manyathela. Should parties fail to meet the deadline, municipal managers and, in some cases, provincial MECs responsible for local government may have to step in to keep councils functioning until a government is elected. That interim administration carries its own costs and delays.

Moakes argued that negotiations should begin not with the spoils but with the operating needs of municipalities: service delivery, infrastructure shortages and governance priorities. “Most political parties to date undertake coalition negotiations on the basis of what positions party is going to get, who’s going to be the mayor, who’s going to be the deputy mayor, who’s going to be the speaker,” he said. What South Africans want, he added, are proper agreements focused on what coalition governments will do rather than who occupies which office.

Dr Thina Nzo, a senior researcher at the University of the Witwatersrand, framed the accountability problem in similar terms. Past coalition deals have been shrouded in secrecy, she said, leaving the public unable to judge whether parties agreed on measurable objectives or performance expectations. The distribution of posts in mayoral committees, service delivery departments and portfolio committees has become the central currency of negotiation, yet parties entering executive positions are rarely held to agreed standards. Without clear expectations for office-bearers, including mayors, and without parties being required to explain removals, votes of no confidence risk becoming another source of instability rather than a tool for addressing poor performance.

Her most striking proposal is economic in its logic: let residents elect mayors directly. Because parties currently determine mayors through council bargaining, voters have little influence over who leads their municipality, a problem that sharpens when the mayoralty is traded as a bargaining chip. Nzo suggested a third ballot paper for a directly elected mayor, chosen on a proposed programme of action and answerable for delivering it, with a referendum as a possible removal mechanism. Moakes called the idea interesting, though he noted some voters might question another ballot paper, and that direct elections elsewhere can require candidates to win more than 50% of the vote, sometimes forcing a second round. He argued voters were already punishing underperforming coalition partners at the ballot box, pointing to the performance of parties in Johannesburg, including the ANC, EFF, Al Jama-ah and the Patriotic Alliance. These questions were explored in a recent analysis published at https://www.ewn.co.za/coalition-politics-should-south-africans-elect-their-mayors-directly/

Meanwhile, the proposed Municipal Structures Amendment Bill of 2026 adds further variables to the market for council seats. Its most contentious element, a 1% electoral threshold that would bar parties below that share from a council seat, has drawn opposition from parties that see it as a threat to democracy. Nzo asked what becomes of the hundreds of voters who supported such parties, warning that their democratic voices risk being suppressed. Losses by smaller parties such as the Patriotic Alliance and Al Jama-ah could intensify the debate. Moakes highlighted another clause extending the coalition formation window from 14 to 30 days, which he said could allow parties to negotiate more carefully and develop an actual programme of action.

Kingmakers carry heavy leverage in this environment. Moakes identified ActionSA as a key player in Gauteng and the Patriotic Alliance as one to watch in several Western Cape municipalities, noting that parties such as ActionSA were likely approached by both the ANC and DA. Nzo cautioned that smaller parties have previously traded their votes for mayoral positions, and questioned whether the quality and suitability of candidates appointed that way was sufficient; proportionality, she argued, should guide appointments. She also flagged the risk of national and provincial arrangements, including the Government of National Unity and coalitions in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, being used as bargaining chips in local talks, though Moakes argued coalitions should ideally be negotiated at municipal level around community needs.

The financial constraints run deep. Responding to a listener, Nzo acknowledged that ward councillors’ roles have often been reduced to electioneering and relaying complaints; their ability to act depends heavily on municipal budgets, revenue collection and available resources. She pointed to ActionSA’s use of a poll on coalition preferences as positive democratic participation, and suggested councillors could use ward meetings and platforms such as WhatsApp to gauge resident priorities. Moakes stressed that parties must explain both why they entered coalitions and what they intend to achieve, warning that junior partners cannot simply distance themselves from service delivery failures when they sit in government. “It’s one thing to form a government, it’s a second thing to take voters with you,” he said.

Both experts expect a messy year. Nzo said parties must show political maturity and abandon the winner-takes-all approach, while Moakes predicted a difficult process in which parties negotiate privately but must ultimately account publicly. Whether the 30-day window in the amendment bill becomes law may decide whether the next round of coalitions produces programmes or merely positions.

Q&A

How many declared councils are hung and why does that matter for municipal finances?

Seventy-two of the 90 councils declared by the Independent Electoral Commission are hung, meaning no party holds an outright majority and budgets, revenue collection and infrastructure spending depend on coalition deals.

What is the deadline to establish the first council meeting under the Municipal Structures Act, and what happens if it is missed?

Parties have 14 days from the declaration of results to establish the first council meeting, where votes for mayor and speaker take place. Failing that, municipal managers and in some cases provincial MECs may step in, which carries its own costs and delays.

What are the most contentious elements of the proposed Municipal Structures Amendment Bill of 2026?

It would bar parties below a 1% share of the vote from a council seat, drawing opposition from parties that see it as a threat to democracy. It also extends the coalition formation window from 14 to 30 days, which Moakes said could allow more careful negotiation and an actual programme of action.

What is the direct election of mayors proposal and what are its noted drawbacks?

Dr Thina Nzo proposed a third ballot paper for a directly elected mayor, chosen on a proposed programme of action and answerable for delivering it, with a referendum as a possible removal mechanism. Moakes called the idea interesting but noted some voters may question another ballot paper and that direct elections elsewhere can require over 50% of the vote, sometimes forcing a second round.